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IS THE U.C.C. PREPARED FOR THE
THRIFTS' NOWS, NINOWS, AND
SHARE DRAFTS?
Fairfax Leary, Jr. *
Now that the Federal Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Mone-
tary Control Act' is law, a question arises as to the law applicable to the
processing for collection and payment of the new payment instruments
which draft on accounts in thrift institutions such as state and federal sav-
ings and loan associations and credit unions. This Article addresses the
proper legal classification of the new NOWs, NINOWs, share drafts, and
similar instruments.2 Operating within the constraints of a Uniform Com-
mercial Code drafted when these new developments were not even within
the penumbra of the draftsmen's consciousness, will the courts, aided by
the contracts of the parties, be able to interpret the U.C.C. to cover these
new instruments? Will the Code cover new methods of collection, particu-
larly where at some point after its origination a paper order for payment is
converted into an electronic message conveying less than all of the infor-
mation on the original order?
This Article is not going to discuss the legal aspects of whether state
chartered thrift institutions have the charter power to engage in draft pro-
grams now that all federal associations may do so. Some battles undoubt-
edly remain to be fought on that front,3 but we are here concerned with
* Visiting Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. A.B., 1932, Princeton; J.D., 1935,
Harvard. Public Member, Former National Commission on Electronic Fund Transfer.
This article is an expanded version of a speech delivered at the 1980 Conference of Credit
Union Attorneys on October 2, 1980 at the Broadwater Beach Hotel in Biloxi, Mississippi.
1. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (Mar. 31, 1980). Title III of the Act is the Con-
sumer Checking Account Equity Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 301-313, 94 Stat. 132
(to be codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. NOW is the acronym for Negotiable Order of Withdrawals, NINOW for a Non-
Interest Bearing Negotiable Order of Withdrawal account, WOW for a Written (to indicate
non-negotiable) Order of Withdrawal, and POW is used for a Payment Order for With-
drawal. These usually refer to accounts in mutual savings banks and savings and loan or
building and loan associations. Drafts drawn on credit unions are called "share drafts."
3. As to credit union share drafts, see Florida Bankers Ass'n v. Leon County Teachers
Credit Union, 359 So. 2d 886 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (share drafts authorized), cert. de-
nied, 368 So. 2d 1366 (1979); Bartonville Bank v. Callaghan, No. 77-h-22948 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
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legal issues which can arise in the operation of a draft program which we
shall postulate as being within the organizational power of the thrift insti-
tution to operate.
Since the credit union share draft program raises all of the legal issues,
this Article will refer to that program extensively. The credit union share
draft program is already big business but, as yet, nowhere near the size of
the check handling business.4 Current information as to the operation of
savings and loan drafts is not presently available to the writer. However,
the July, 1980 evaluation report by the International Credit Union Service
Corporation5 on the credit union share draft program shows that drafts
paid during that month amounted to over a billion and a half dollars in
credit union assets. This means an almost thirty per cent annual turnover
of deposits, without allowing for the fact that many credit unions, probably
the smaller ones, may not yet have share draft programs. The figures indi-
cate an average of about 12,500 share drafts paid per month for each credit
union, ranging from a high of 47,777 per credit union for the ten credit
unions using First National Bank & Trust Co. of Oklahoma City as their
"payable-through" bank, to a low of about 1,000 a month per credit union
in the Northeast. The share drafts averaged fifteen and one-half per active
account for the month, and the amount of the average draft was $68.32.
Even at these figures, a fully allocated unit cost, or per account cost of the
share draft program is probably presently comparatively higher than the
Cook County, May 17, 1979) (share drafts not authorized); Iowa Credit Union League v.
Iowa Dep't of Banking, 268 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa 1978) (share drafts not authorized); Michigan
Bankers Ass'n v. Commissioner of Financial Inst., No. 77-20045-AA (Mich. Cir. Ct. Inchan
County, Feb. 12, 1979) (share drafts authorized); Oklahoma Bankers Ass'n v. Oklahoma
State Credit Union Bd., No. C.D. 77-623 (Okla. Dist. Ct., June 26, 1979) (share drafts not
authorized); Texas Bankers Ass'n v. Government Employees Credit Union, No. 78-CI-4577
(Tex. Dist. Ct. Bexar County, Dec. 10, 1979) (share drafts authorized).
As to savings banks, see Androscoggin County Sav. Bank v. Campbell, 282 A.2d 858 (Me.
1971) (checks not authorized); Savings Bank of Baltimore v. Bank Comm'r of Md., 248 Md.
461, 237 A.2d 45 (1968) (checks on deposits authorized); Consumer Sav. Bank v. Commis-
sioner of Banks, 361 Mass. 717, 282 N.E.2d 416 (1972) (checks authorized); Hudson County
Nat'l Bank v. Provident Inst. for Savings, 44 N.J. 282, 208 A.2d 409 (1965) (checks on depos-
its authorized); New York State Bankers Ass'n v. Albright, 38 N.Y.2d 430, 343 N.E.2d 735,
381 N.Y.S.2d 17 (1975) (checks not authorized); Pennsylvania Bankers Ass'n v. Secretary of
Banking, 481 Pa. 332, 392 A.2d 1319 (1978) (drafts with notice of drawee's 14-day notice
right authorized) (regulation requiring notice on draft now changed); Washington Bankers
Ass'n v. Washington Mut. Say. Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 453, 598 P.2d 719 (1979) (checks author-
ized).
As to savings and loan associations, see Wisconsin Bankers Ass'n v. Mutual Sav. & Loan
Ass'n of Wisc., 96 Wisc. 2d 438, 291 N.W.2d 869 (1980).
4. Estimated variously at between 37 billion to 40 billion checks a year.
5. INTERNATIONAL CREDIT UNION SERVICE CORPORATION, REPORT ON SHARE
DRAFT PROGRAM (July, 1980) [hereinafter cited as ICUSC Report].
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cost of check processing in commercial banks because of volume differ-
ences, although substantial savings are accomplished by the non-return of
share drafts to credit union members and the use of the high-speed mecha-
nized equipment of the "payable-through" processors.6 Perhaps these
July, 1980 figures are on the high side due to vacations taken in July. But
they do indicate that share drafts are now here in substantial volume.
The big question is, "What law applies to the collection and payment of
share drafts?" Put another way, how will the courts allocate the losses
arising from wrongful intrusions into the share draft payment process?
As we take our brief journey with gun and camera through the wilder-
ness of Articles 3 and 4 of that treasury of golden wit and humor called the
Uniform Commercial Code, we shall be considering the application of
those articles to the credit union share draft program7 and, in general, to
other draft accounts of other thrift institutions. We shall assume that the
functional purpose for which credit union members and other thrift cus-
tomers use drafts is to make payment of obligations, or to give gifts to
others by the transfer of share draft credit of the members into depositary
institution credit at the institution chosen by their creditors or donees. To
do this we must look at the payment process on two levels: the message
level and the mutual account level. The share draft does not transfer
funds. That is done by the debits and credits entered in an underlying
network of related mutual accounts in the several institutions through
which the share draft or its electronic summary passes on its journey from
the payee-creditor to the designated payable-through bank. The share
draft is just the message that triggers the posting of the debits and credits
until the debit is entered in the thrift institution's account at the payable-
through bank. At that point the message is forwarded to the credit union
by an electronic transmission of the encoded Magnetic Ink Character Rec-
ognition (MICR) line on the bottom of the share draft. The numbers in
this line give the designation of the payable-through institution, then the
credit union number and the account number of the member writing the
draft, the member's serial number for the draft, and the encoded amount
of the draft. This last amount is placed thereon in magnetic ink characters
by the institution in which the draft is deposited or, if that institution does
6. Many share drafts and thrift drafts are drawn "payable through" a designated com-
mercial bank whose routing numbers are printed in Magnetic Ink Character Recognition
(MICR) characters in the first field at the bottom of the draft.
7. INTERNATIONAL CREDIT UNION SERVICE CORPORATION, STATEMENT OF OPERA-
TIONAL SPECIFICATIONS FOR THE ICU SHARE DRAFT PROGRAM (February, 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ICUSC Statement].
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not have MICR encoding equipment, by the first institution having such
equipment that handles the draft for collection.
The first problem that is encountered is whether only Article 3 of the
Uniform Commercial Code applies, or whether Article 4 also applies, be-
cause there are fundamental differences in both timing and coverage that
hang on that issue.
There is no question but that the form of share draft set forth in the
footnote,8 when filled out in the usual manner, is a commercial paper ne-
gotiable instrument subject to Article 3 of the Code. It is a draft payable to
the order of a named payee,9 in a sum certain." ° No time of payment is
8. Form of Credit Union Share Draft and Self-Carbon
JAMES C. MORRISON 125
1765 SHERIDAN DRIVE
YOUR MTY YOUR STATE 123450-86 9_V 00-6789
JJ 2345
PAY TOT- 6 ac THE!!
ORDER OF , o oa6 o
A
,: /e: , ,OU_ CIT, l UoA123o^
Self-Made Carbon of Above
CHECK MENE IF TAX DEDUCTIBLE ITEM 6(l]
JAMES C. MORRISON L f 125
1765 SHERIDAN DRIVE
YOUR CITY. YOUR STATE 123 /A8) o
Ala avre /3a- Assh PTW
4 X CHECK~ PIN4TERS, WC SAMP 1 VI
YUR CITYU.S.A. 12345 ......
1:23456?q8s: 12356?P NOT NEGOTIABLE
9. U.C.C. § 3-102(I)(b).
10. Id §§ 3-104(a), (b), 3-106.
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specified so it is payable on demand." It names the drawee with sufficient
precision.' 2 It is payable through a commercial bank.'3 It will be signed
by the drawer as required.' 4 Clearly it is an "item" under the definition in
Article 4.15
If, under its organic law, a credit union is prohibited from using checks
or other negotiable orders of withdrawal, then instead of a NOW, it will
use a WOW,' 6 by having the share drafts printed "pay to" rather than
"pay to the order of," and the Code makes all of Article 3 applicable ex-
cept that there can be no holder in due course, 17 and it will still be an item
under Article 4's definition of that term. But is it just a draft with a non-
bank drawee, or is it a "check" defined as a draft payable on demand
drawn on a bank?' 8 Why should this make any difference?
The answer is that even in Article 3 there are different rules for drafts
and checks as to the time allowed for presentment and, if that time is
missed in the collection process, the result is a discharge of drawers and
endorsers. This follows since under Article 3 a draft must be presented for
payment to the drawer within a reasonable time after the date of its actual
issue, or the date stated thereon, whichever is later.'9 But if the instrument
is a check drawn and payable within the United States, then we have two
statutory presumptions about reasonable time for presentment. The pre-
sumptions apply to the time in which to make presentment or to initiate
bank collection. The time for indorsements is seven days, and for the
drawer the time is thirty days.20 Actually, today, presentment is faster
than the period in the presumptions in most cases. But the presumption
rules only apply to checks, and checks must be drawn on a bank.
So, for Uniform Commercial Code purposes, is a credit union a "bank?"
The Code defines a "bank" as "any person engaged in the business of
banking," 21 which is almost a Gertrude Stein type of definition drawn
from similar language in section 191 of the old 1895 Negotiable Instru-
ments Law. Banking then was done only by commercial banks and per-
11. Id §3-108.
12. Id. § 3-102(i)(b).
13. Id. § 3-120 stated that the bank so named is "a" bank to make presentment. The
implication is a good presentment may be made by others.
14. Id § 3-104(I)(a).
15. Id. § 4-104(g)
16. See note 2 supra.
17. U.C.C. § 3-805.
18. Id § 3-104(2)(b).
19. Id § 3-503(i)(b).
20. Id § 3-503(2)(a), (b).
21. Id § 1-201(4).
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haps by a few savings banks, some of which had checking accounts. Both
were called banks. The definition caused no problems. Does the defini-
tion refer us to the local law of the state for a more precise definition of the
"business of banking?" Or can there be developed a U.C.C. uniform inter-
pretation of "business of banking" limited solely for the purposes of Arti-
cles 3 and 4? Or must the parties involved, or at least those most
significantly involved, cover the matter by agreement, and how detailed
must that agreement be?
First then, let us discuss briefly whether the Code can and should be
construed so that for the purpose of handling share drafts, and all the cote-
rie of NOWs, WOWs, NINOWs, and POWs,22 the term "bank" in Articles
3 and 4 should be construed as covering any depositary institution partici-
pating in the payments system through the utilization of third party pay-
ment orders. This becomes all the more important now that the Federal
Home Loan Banks are being authorized to provide account processing,
data processing and sorting, data communications, and transportation and
storage of items for savings and loans.23 What will the rules be there?
The cardinal rule of the Code as to its interpretation is stated to be that:
"This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underly-
ing purposes and policies."24 The Comment to this section states that its
purpose is "to make it possible for the law embodied in this Act to be
developed by the courts in the light of unforeseen and new circumstances
and practices." The Comment also states that "the proper construction of
the Act requires that its interpretation and application be limited to its
reason." The Comment goes on to state that courts have recognized the
policy embodied in a Uniform Act as applicable in reason to subject mat-
ter which was either not expressly included in the language of the Act, or
was intentionally excluded from the Act in general language. In an unu-
sual step for U.C.C. Comments, case authority for these conclusions from
the Supreme Court of the United States and the New York Court of Ap-
peals is cited in the Comment.25 Some forty-five years ago James M. Lan-
dis, later to be chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and
Dean of the Harvard Law School, wrote an article entitled Statutes as
22. See note 2 supra.
23. See 45 Fed. Reg. 66,781 (1980) (to be codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 526, 545, 563).
24. U.C.C. § 1-102(1).
25. See, e.g., Commercial Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v. Canal La. Bank & Trust Co.,
329 U.S. 520 (1917) (extending Warehouse Receipts Act's policy); Fiterman v. J.N. Johnson
& Co., 156 Minn. 201, 194 N.W. 399 (1923) (disregarding limitation on remedy of rescission
where reason for limitation does not apply); Agar v. Orda, 264 N.Y. 248, 190 N.E. 479
(1934) (Sales Act applied to sale of chose in action).
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Sources of the Law,26 which also contains much helpful precedent on the
application of the principles of statutes to cases not specifically covered by
deciding by analogy to the statute. Can one rely on all courts in all states
to reach this result by either interpreting the word "bank" in the Code, and
using the Code, or using the Code sections as precedent by analogy.27 Re-
cent experience indicates that in advising clients this may not be a safe
course to follow, even though in logic and reason courts should reach this
result for the collection problems involved. Thrifts have had to litigate
with commercial bankers over the share draft program in several jurisdic-
tions.2" So have the investment bankers with their "draft-on-your-securi-
ties-accounts" programs.29 But while this litigation involves classification
for a far different purpose, nevertheless, by reason of it a result contrary to
that here urged could be reached under the U.C.C. The argument would
be that "the business of banking" means the business expressly authorized
to be performed by the institutions organized and operating under a stat-
ute called the banking law, as distinguished from those incorporated under
a credit union act or a building and loan act. The courts are divided on
whether the necessary and incidental powers clause in the charter powers
granted these institutions includes the power to operate NOW or NINOW
accounts. A very conservative court could say banking means the business
of commercial banks and suggest that change is for the legislature. It
should not, but it might.
How difficult would it be to obtain legislation changing the Code defini-
tion of a bank? The change need only be that the clause "bank means any
person engaged in the business of banking"3 be amended by adding to
that definition the following:
26. Landis, Statutes as Sources of the Law, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213ff (1934) (in
honor of Joseph Henry Beale and Samuel Williston) referring to the doctrine of the Equity
of the Statute and the approach of early English Law. Wherein Plowden said ". . . some-
times the sense is more confined and contracted than the Letter, and sometimes it is more
large and extensive." Eyston v. Studd, Plowd. 459, 465 (1573) (as cited in Landis).
27. Consideration must be given to state statutory construction acts. For example, sub-
section (b) of the Pennsylvania Statutory Construction Act, I PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 192 1(b) (Purdon Supp. 1980) reads: "When the words of a statute are clear and free from
all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit."
However, id § 1927 reads: "Statutes uniform with those of other states shall be interpreted
and construed to effect their general purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which
enact them." In context, recent developments do make the terms "bank" and "business of
banking" as used in the U.C.C. not free from all ambiguity.
28. See note 3 supra.
29. See Opinion of Attorney General (Wash. May 30, 1978) (did constitute business of
banking). The Colorado Banking Department accepted a plan limiting drafts to $500 and
up, as not the business of banking.
30. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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and solely for the purposes of Articles 3 and 4 of this Act, in-
cludes any mutual savings bank, savings or building and loan
association, credit union, or industrial bank or other institution
having the power to offer accounts subject, to withdrawal by ne-
gotiable or nonnegotiable third party payment order even though
the account is subject to an option of the institution to require a
stated period of advance notice before the institution is under ob-
ligation to its customer to honor the order.
With the Depositary Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act on the books, the opposition of the commercial banks may not be as
great. But amending the U.C.C. would be difficult given any commercial
bank opposition. The difficulty is increased because the American Law
Institute and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are even now
contemplating substantial revisions to Articles 3 and 4 and could urge that
no change be made until their proposals are complete." This might re-
quire a period of time measured in years.
So the safe course is to proceed by contract, to the extent that the appli-
cation of Articles 3 or 4 is needed and continue to urge the courts to inter-
pret the term "bank" as covering credit unions and other thrifts for the
purposes of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. or to apply the rules to the thrift
institutions by analogy.32
The discussion in this Article will cover the extent of the needed contract
under three topics. First will be the account relationship between the
credit union and the member. Second, we will consider the processing of
items both as to time limits and as to the truncation process. Finally, we
will discuss the allocation of losses from wrongful intrusions into the pay-
ments process. Under each of these topics we shall first consider the im-
pact on the issues of a determination of whether the credit union is
regarded as a bank or that the rules of the Code are to be applied by anal-
ogy to what are near-bank situations;3 3 and then examine the extent to
which contract provisions between a thrift institution and its customers as
to the deposit draft account will reach the desired result.
31. A 3-4-8 Committee has been appointed, under the Chairmanship of Robert
Haydock, Esq. of Bingham, Dana & Gould, Boston, Mass., with Professor Harold Scott of
Harvard as reporter, to propose revisions of Articles 3 and 4 of the U.C.C. into a code for all
payments systems.
32. Since many sections of the Code have been applied by analogy in other circum-
stances, why not here? For example, consider the cases applying the Article 2 warranties to
other than sale of goods cases, other parts of Article 2 to sales of intangibles, and the general
effect of the U.C.C.'s contractual provisions on the drafting of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS.
33. Indeed, the Canadian term for depositary institutions that are not chartered as com-
mercial banks is "near banks."
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I. THE ACCOUNT RELATIONSHIP
Most of the rules bearing on the account relationship are in Part 4 of
Article 4 of the U.C.C. This is the Part that, if applicable, would most
directly deal with the relationship between a thrift institution as drawee,
and its customer as drawer. But unfortunately, this part of the Code is
phrased in terms of a bank's relationship to its customer, defined as "any
person having an account with a bank or for whom a bank has agreed to
collect items."34 Nevertheless a credit union and its members, or a savings
and loan and its customers clearly may agree that the rules applicable to
bank and customer under the U.C.C. may apply to and govern the rela-
tions between them with respect to the share draft account, so far as their
mutual rights and duties as against each other are concerned.3 5
The Code permits a bank to charge otherwise properly payable items to
the customer's account even though the charge creates an overdraft, and
hence a loan made without the formalities of a loan.36 One purpose of the
section, of course, is to prevent the customer from claiming an improper
payment and that the check should have been returned "N.S.F." rather
than having been paid. The basic share draft agreement suggested for
credit unions37 provides that the credit union is "under no obligation to
pay" a draft creating an overdraft, but does not give the credit union im-
munity if it should do so, by mistake or otherwise. The authorization to
pay share drafts signed by the member may be interpreted as covering only
those against good funds. As between institution and customer, the cus-
tomer should bear the burden of an inadvertent loan, particularly when
the loan may not be an authorized one.
The Code permits the charge to the account of an obviously completed
item without inquiry as to the authority of the person completing it.38 The
rule requires the bank to act in good faith, and to be without knowledge
that the completion was improper. This precludes litigation based on alle-
gations that obvious completions raise a duty of inquiry as to the authority
of the person completing. A thrift institution should have these protec-
tions, and can get them by contract with its customers.
34. U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(e).
35. Clearly where, by the organic law under which the institution is chartered, the ac-
count relationship is to be established by the "by laws" or "rules and regulations" of the
institution, the provisions suggested should be so adopted.
36. U.C.C. § 4-401(1). A question can arise whether this type of loan is authorized
under the applicable organic law of the thrift institution.
37. See note 7 supra.
38. U.C.C. § 3-401(2).
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Wrongful dishonor can result in substantial damages,39 and, since the
dishonor carries a sting, the rules of defamation used to apply. The Code
limits liability when the wrongful dishonor occurs through mistake to the
actual damages proved, including consequential damages proved.4" Being
subject to this rule could be helpful to thrift institutions where slander of
credit allegations are involved in wrongful dishonor cases. Contracts
could so provide.
The next section governs stop payment orders.4 ' This problem is not
covered in the proposed agreement form suggested for credit unions. The
Statement of Operations Specifications,42 in a paragraph, appropriately
numbered 13, treats of stop payments. It provides that the order "must be
received so that the credit union has a reasonable opportunity to act on it
prior to its deadline for returning the item." The official version of the
Code provides that, unless confirmed in writing, the oral order is effective
for only fourteen days. The written order is what is effective for six
months. The section also provides that the order must be received "at such
a time and in such a manner" as to give the bank a reasonable time to act
on it. Today, courts are holding banks liable for not making clear to the
customer just what data must be furnished to enable the bank's data
processing procedure to handle the stop order. Where the key item was
the exact amount of the check to be stopped, the bank not telling this very
specifically to the customer has been held liable under the pre-U.C.C.
cases holding an "approximate" amount sufficient when the payee's name
was given.43 Some revision in the language of agreement and operating
specifications will be helpful, especially as the credit union in authorizing
payment by its payable-through processor will not know the name of the
payee. This is a situation where a little greater description in the docu-
mentation that will come before the court can have a most helpful impact
on the judicial approach to the problem.
And stop payments are a problem, averaging fifteen per month per
credit union in the share draft program. In July, 1980, return items as a
percent of total items paid ran from 0% in Maine to 2.6% in Iowa, with an
average for those reporting of about 1.01%. 44 But stop orders ranged from
39. See, e.g., Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United Cal. Bank, 50 Cal. App. 3d 949, 123 Cal.
Rptr. 848 (1975) (emotional distress); Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1975) (punitive damages).
40. U.C.C. § 4-402.
41. Id § 4-403(1).
42. See ICUSC Statement, supra note 7.
43. See Sherrill v. Frank Morris Pontiac-Buick-GMC, Inc., 366 So. 2d 251 (Ala. 1978);
FJS Electronics, Inc. v. Fidelity Bank, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 1462 (Pa. C.P. 1980).
44. See ICUSC Report, supra note 5.
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a high of 18% of returns for items paid through Chase Manhattan Bank to
a low of zero stop orders. The average, weighted by the large processors,
showed just under 12% of returns were for stop orders or 12 hundredths of
1% of all share drafts processed. Yet missing a stop can cause customer
dissatisfaction let alone consequential damages. In this area there does not
seem to be much difference between the U.C.C. and the contract forms
used. Neither works very well but the U.C.C. limitation of damages where
the failure to stop was by mistake will be helpful.
There are a few points in the Code that are not covered in the agree-
ments or specifications proposed for credit unions. Section 4-404 of the
U.C.C. provides that while a bank is not under obligation to pay a check
that is presented more than six months after its date, it is protected if it
does so in good faith. An interesting section is 4-405, providing that a
bank's authority to pay is not automatically revoked by the death or in-
competence of a customer. Only knowledge of the death or knowledge of
an adjudication of incompetence affects the bank. Under subsection (2) of
that section, even with knowledge the bank may, for ten days after the date
of death, pay checks drawn before death unless directed by someone
claiming an interest in the account not to pay.45 This ability to pay would
also be helpful to thrift institutions. The U.C.C. cannot affect bankruptcy
law, but there is a provision in the new bankruptcy code which covers the
issue for bankruptcy.46
These last mentioned provisions affect the rights of third parties. It is
difficult to see how a contract between credit union and member, or other
thrift and customer, can accomplish the same result. But treating a credit
union or other thrift as a bank for Article 4 purposes would.47
Article 3 has no provisions governing the drawer-drawee relationship.
There are provisions governing the liability of the drawee to third parties.
Thus section 3-401 provides that no person is liable on an instrument un-
less that person's signature appears thereon. This was considered suffi-
ciently important to be repeated again in section 3-409 providing that a
45. This is an instance in which one not a "customer" on the account in question can
order a stop. The Code does not specify how the order is to be given, or whether it can apply
only to specific items or must cover the entire account. When asserted by taxing authorities,
all payments are usually stopped. Any other claimant specifying a particular item could be,
under U.C.C. § 1-103, estopped from claiming that more should have been stopped. The
rules of §§ 4-403 and 4-303 would apply to timing.
46. Bankruptcy Code, § 521 (1978), which codifies the result reached in Bank of Main
v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
47. If the rule is in the deposit contract, parties succeeding to the depositor's interest
would be bound. The payee certainly cannot object to being paid. The estate creditors
would be estopped by their failure to order a stop claiming a creditor interest in the account.
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draft, of itself, is not an assignment. The section goes on to say that the
drawee is not liable on an instrument until the drawee accepts it. Else-
where, in section 3-410, "acceptance" is defined as the drawee's signed en-
gagement to honor the draft as presented. Acceptance occurs when the
drawee signs the instrument, usually across the face. If the instrument is a
check, acceptance is called certification. Under section 3-411, where a
check is certified at the request of a holder, the drawer and all who have
indorsed prior to the certification are discharged. Unless a credit union or
other thrift is treated as a bank, this discharge would not happen if the
institution certified one of the drafts drawn on it.
One final point should be made in our discussion of the drawer-drawee
relationship. Is there a rule of law or of contract governing the drawee's
obligation to the drawer where, on one given day, the total number of
drafts presented for payment calls for a sum of money exceeding the bal-
ance of the account, but several are for lesser sums? Which ones should
the drawee pay? Must a drawee pay in the order of receipt? Must the
greater number be paid, or the ones having the largest dollar amount?
Pre-Code theories could be found supporting an affirmative answer to each
of these questions a.4  The U.C.C. in section 4-303(2) simply states a rule of
convenience, "any order convenient to the bank." Again a good rule not
applicable unless the thrift is considered a bank for the purpose of the
U.C.C., or sufficiently like a bank so that the rule should be applied by
analogy. Otherwise, perhaps, there might be another sentence in the con-
tract with the customer making such extensive use of his share draft ac-
count that the problem could arise.
On net balance it appears that thrift institutions, considering the rules
applicable to the drawer-drawee relationship, will fare better if Article 4 of
the U.C.C. were applicable than if the governing rules have to be estab-
lished by contract. Yet the advantages are, on the whole, not substantial
enough in themselves to deter any thrift institution from embarking on a
share draft program even if Article 4 of the U.C.C. is not applicable.
II. THE PROCESSING AND PAYMENT OF DRAFTS
The function of the draft on a thrift institution from the customer's point
of view is to pay debts or transfer funds. The drawer, however, under
U.C.C. section 3-413(2) contracts to pay if the drawee does not, but condi-
tioned upon "dishonor" (which includes making any necessary present-
ment) and the making of any necessary protest. Equally U.C.C. section 3-
48. See the cases on when a check is paid pre-Code in F. BEUTEL, BRANNAN NEGOTIA-
BLE INSTRUMENTS LAW (7th ed. 1971).
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414(1) on the indorser's contract provides the same conditional guaranty of
payment. In both cases, the use of the words "without recourse" or the like
serves, by virtue of express words in the statute,49 to disclaim this contrac-
tual warranty. It may be questioned whether anyone would take a draft
drawn without recourse, although indorsing without recourse is not un-
common, as where a draft or check is made payable to several payees: the
home owners, the mortgagee, and an adjustment company to protect the
latter's commission. But if the commission has been paid and the mortga-
gee is satisfied with the owner's plans to rebuild, both the adjustment com-
pany and the mortgagee could, and perhaps should, indorse without
recourse. Or, the case may be that a customer is paying for some work
done on the home by a contractor using two subcontractors. The share
draft is made payable to all three, but one subcontractor is not entitled to
any money at the time and would sign off without recourse.
What are presentment and notice of dishonor and protest? How are
they worked in the share draft program where the original share draft
never is delivered to the drawee credit union for payment? The answers
are found in Part 5 of Article 3 of the Code. Presentment is defined as "a
demand for. . payment made upon the. . . drawee. . . by or on behalf
of the holder."5 Holder is defined as a "person who is in possession of..
an instrument. . . drawn, issued, or indorsed to him or to his order or to
bearer or in blank.'" The payable-through bank receives the draft in-
dorsed, usually, "pay any bank" and being itself a bank is a holder. Thus,
presentment under the Code is merely a "demand" for payment. The
Comment buttresses the literal reading of the words by saying that the
intent is "to make it clear that any demand upon the party to pay is a
presentment no matter where or how."52 As Professor Prosser used to ex-
plain, if the proper officer of a payor is found in a rest room of a hotel and
demand for payment is there asserted, a proper presentment has been
made. It is true that U.C.C. section 3-504 does specify three ways in which
"presentment may be made" and section 4-210 specifies ways in which a
collecting bank may safely make a presentment to a nonbank drawee.
However, these ways are permissive, not mandatory. Hence, the author is
of the opinion that the electronic transmission by the payable-through
bank to the credit union of the MICR line on the bottom of the share draft,
including the encoded amount, is a proper presentment.
The Code does provide certain actions which the party to pay, in this
49. See U.C.C. §§ 3-414(1), 3-417(3).
50. Id § 3-504(1).
51. Id § 1-201(20).
52. Id § 3-504 (Official Comment 1).
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case the credit union, may require of the presenter without dishonor."
These are four in number: (1) exhibition of the instrument, (2) reasonable
identification of the person making the presentment and evidence of au-
thority to make it, if made for another, (3) that the instrument be produced
for payment at a place specified in it or, if there be none, at any place
reasonable in the circumstances, and (4) a signed receipt on the instrument
for any payment. Since it is optional with any payor whether to require
these, they can be waived in advance by agreement. In fact, there is need
to waive only three of the four because the electronic transmission identi-
fies the transmitter, who by the words "payable through" has been desig-
nated by the drawer and indorser, as a person to make presentment. The
instrument for which payment is being asked is identified by drawer ac-
count number and draft serial number, and the drawee will receive the
benefit of the presentment warranties of U.C.C. section 3-417(1) in any
event.
By agreeing to this method of presentment and waiving the right to an
exhibition of the instrument is the credit union exposed to any liability not
covered by the presentment warranties? One is obliged to say yes, but not
any liability that commercial banks do not routinely assume, namely the
risk of forgery of a drawer's signature. There will be a warranty of good
title which covers forged or otherwise unauthorized indorsements where
the person whose signature is not valid is not precluded from asserting the
lack of authority.14 But as to the drawer's signature there is no warranty
by a holder in due course presenting in good faith, and nonholders in due
course only warrant a lack of knowledge. As a routine matter, most banks
do not check drawer's signatures before payment of items below a certain
amount. Losses due to forgery do not warrant the expense. It can be as-
sumed that forgery losses on share draft and other individual accounts
would not be significant in any event as the account balances may not be
large enough to satisfy the forger's appetite. Can such losses be covered by
insurance? In commercial banks the "deductible" in the Bankers Blanket
Bond is usually higher than the amount of the nonexamined checks. How-
ever, insurance with a low deductible is available to credit unions and, it is
believed, to saving and loans.
But the risk is there; for a payment by a drawee is final and may not be
recovered on any theory from either a holder in due course or a person
who has in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment."
53. See id § 3-505.
54. Id §§ 417(1), 4-207(1).
55. Id § 3-418.
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There is an implication that recovery is not barred against one who fits
neither of the above categories, and the statute itself in section 3-418 spe-
cifically excepts two, and only two, types of recoveries. These are recovery
of bank payments under Article 4 and recovery for breach of a present-
ment warranty.
If a credit union is not considered a bank for U.C.C. purposes, then only
the breach of warranty and the implication as to the nonfinal type party,
requiring the equitable action for recovery of money paid under mistake,
are available to the credit union or other thrift institution.56
One issue is when is final payment made in the credit union share draft
or other thrift institution situation? If neither a credit union nor a savings
and loan is a bank, then the time for payment is the expiration of the time
for "a reasonable examination to determine whether it is properly payable,
but payment must be made in any event before the close of business on the
day of presentment." 7 The day of presentment is the day of receipt of the
transmission from the payable-through bank. The determination of prop-
erly payable is made by examining the state of the account at the time of
receipt of the transmission, checking for any active stop orders, and the
making of an official judgment to pay after any account review to deter-
mine whether to exercise any set-off by calling a loan or whether to ad-
vance funds to pay under the conditions of any overdraft protection plan
giving the credit union an option not to make the advance.
Due, probably, to a mistake in the drafting of the Code, Article 4's defi-
nition of "properly payable" in section 4-104(l)(i) was not carried over
into Article 3 by section 3-102(3) which did carry back to Article 3 many of
the Article 4 definitions. The definition laconically states that the term
"includes the availability of funds."
58
If a credit union or savings and loan is not a bank, then the definition of
"process of posting" does not apply,59 and neither do the provisions as to
provisional payment and recovery thereof,6" nor do the provisions as to
56. The extra day provided by the permitted payor bank under U.C.C. § 4-301 would
not be available unless the near-banks are within the Code definition of bank, or there is an
appropriate clearing house rule or Federal Reserve Board Regulation. Drawee liability
under § 3-419(l)(c), (2) could be avoided, however, by one interpretation of the "demand"
per return in the presentment as including the full period of the midnight deadline of § 4-
104(l)(b) and a right of revocation of the "provisional" same day settlements.
57. U.C.C. § 3-506(2).
58. It obviously includes a proper drawer's signature and one "effective" or geniune
indorsement.
59. U.C.C. § 4-109.
60. Id. §§ 4-301, 4-302(a).
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when any one of the four legals comes too late.6 The four legals are: first,
any legal process seizing the account; second, the exercise of a right of
setoff; third, the receipt of a stop order from the customer; and, fourth, the
receipt of any knowledge or notice that the Code or local law suspends or
terminates a drawee's right to make disbursements from the account bal-
ance. If it is determined that a credit union or a savings and loan is not a
bank for U.C.C. purposes, then a court will be faced with the choice of
going back to its pre-Code precedents, if any, as to nonbank drawees, or
returning to the pre-Code jungle of the law of bank payments, or of using
the sections of Article 4 by analogy as invited to do by the Comments to
section 1-102, as the spirit and purpose of those sections do apply to share
demand drafts on thrift institutions.
As a word of caution against just such an adoption by analogy, or a
ruling that the arrangements between the payable-through bank and the
credit union for sorting and processing by the bank in fact make the bank
a remote processing agent for the credit union so that the "close of business
on the day of presentment" beyond which a nonbank drawee may not de-
fer payment is the day of presentment to the payable-through bank,62 the
arrangements should be carefully reviewed by counsel and the credit
union should draw up a written "determination" of its "process of post-
ing." The "process of posting" for any institution is exactly what that insti-
tution has determined it to be, neither more nor less. The preamble to
section 4-109 stresses the "usual procedure" followed "in determining to
pay an item and in recording the payment including one or more of the
following or other steps as determined by the bank: . . ." Having a written
procedure prepared before a transaction winds up in litigation is extremely
helpful. This was proven in the famous, or infamous, West Side Bank
case.63 The relevant passages from the summary judgment papers in the
lower Wisconsin court set forth the posting procedure used by West Side
and show that in that case the process of posting by the payor bank had
not been completed.64 Although some disagree with this approach, 65 the
case stands, in the opinion of this author, for no more than three proposi-
tions. First, a question of fact existed as to whether the process of posting
had been completed, hence summary judgment could not be granted. Sec-
61. Id §4-303.
62. See id § 3-504.
63. 37 Wis. 2d 661, 155 N.W.2d 587 (1968).
64. See Leary & Tarlow, leflections on Articles 3 and 4for a Review Committee, 48
TEMP. L.Q., 919, 928, n.25.
65. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 701-02 (2d ed.
1980).
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ond, a bank could have a process of posting that provided for the reversal
of entries that were correct when made if, under its process, the time for
making a judgmental decision had not expired and a judgmental decision
required reversal when the correctly made entry was reversed. Third, a
clearing house rule could extend the time for returns until 10:00 a.m. on
the day after the midnight deadline had expired.66
But, in the vast majority of cases, it makes no difference in the time to
act whether the payable-through institution is a bank designated to make
presentment or the draft is payable at or by a bank. The MICR routing
symbols will result in the draft being delivered at the designated bank.
The Federal Reserve System's Regulation J, governing the time allowed
for proper return and giving notice of dishonor, places the same con-
straints on a payable-through bank as apply a to paying bank:67 namely
midnight of the next banking day following the day of receipt, defined as
the midnight deadline.68
But suppose the credit union is not treated as a bank, and the payable-
through organization is not a bank but is treated as a place where the
credit union has, in advance, issued a requirement to have the draft
presented.69 Then the time for payment expires with the close of business
on the day of presentment to the designated payable through organization.
Suppose further the credit union and the processing organization do not
complete the payment by that close of business. What then? Will the
processing unit, which presumptively has made a conditional settlement
for the drafts delivered to it, be able to revoke that payment and recover
for the amount of the returned items?
The solution lies in the "or else" provided in the U.C.C. for failure to
pay on time. There is no provision in Part 5 of Article 3 of the Code
bearing on the issue. Clearly, if the presenter has the draft, the penalty, if
it was properly payable, is liability for wrongful dishonor. But the liability
to the member depositor is hopefully only for the actual damages proved.
However, the Code may come into play and impose a liability to the
holder in conversion.7" Section 3-419(l)(b) provides liability, not "on the
66. The Comments to both U.C.C. §§ 4-109 and 4-213 recognize that paying a check is
a "process," and the process consists of two major elements, one mechanical and the other
judgmental. Nothing requires that the judgmental precede the mechanical. Indeed, in mod-
em check processing it is usually the other way around as the judgmental decisions are made
on the basis of computer print-outs generated by the mechanical process, and hence avail-
able in readable hard copy only upon completion of the mechanical.
67. 12 C.F.R. § 210.1(k)(2) (1980).
68. U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(h).
69. See id § 3-505.
70. See id § 3-419(l)(c), (2) imposing on a drawee are absolute liability for the face
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instrument" but in conversion, where a drawee to whom an instrument has
been delivered "refuses on demand" either to pay or return it. The liabil-
ity of the drawee is the face amount of the instrument. The Comment says
the "demand" required may be made at the time of delivery, or it may be
implied from the circumstances or understood as a matter of custom. The
Comment also states that the word "refuses" is meant to cover any inten-
tional failure to return the instrument, and failure to return through negli-
gence is not included, although negligence might support a cause of action
for damages caused by any delay or destruction. But it would be difficult
to avoid the classification of action taken as a standard procedure as any-
thing but an intentional act. Thus, with a clearing house or Regulation J
requirement for returns, the demand has been made. A standard program
extending the processing procedure beyond the close of business on the
day of presentment is a "refusal" to return with resultant liability on the
drawee for the amount of the item.
The rule of the U.C.C. that a bank may not disclaim liability for its own
negligence or lack of good faith7 is not a hardship for credit unions or
other thrifts. It is true the share-draft contract states that a credit union is
not liable for any action it takes with respect to payment or nonpayment of
a share draft except for negligence.72 This author, however, is very firmly
of the opinion that all courts will read that clause of the contract as mean-
ing "Except for negligence or any grosser misconduct such as willful, wan-
ton, reckless or intentional disregard of the protection of its customer."
Equally, the clause will not excuse a credit union from liability under
U.C.C. Article 3 for paying a share draft with either or both of a forged
drawer's signature or a forged indorsement no matter how genuine they
appear. Even the savings bank passbook rule does not protect unless there
is no negligence, the forgery is of high quality, and the withdrawal order is
accompanied by the passbook which is regarded as a muniment of title.
7 3
The rule arose in an era of mostly personal withdrawals where negligence
in not identifying the person was easy to show, except where the with-
drawal was by correspondence. The rule has not been adopted in all states
and has been repealed for New York by its legislature."
But the time in which to make payment is subject to variation by agree-
amount of an item whether "properly payable" or not if it is not returned on demand, and
that the demand may according to the Comment be included with the presentment.
71. See id § 4-103(1).
72. See ICUSC Statement, supra note 7.
73. See, e.g., Novak v. Greater N.Y. Sav. Bank, 30 N.Y.2d 136, 282 N.E.2d 285, 331
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1972).
74. See N.Y. BANKING LAW § 676 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
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ment. At least as to credit union and member, thrift and depositor, the
agreement could provide that the credit union is authorized to take any
action in the payment and return of drafts that could properly be taken by
a bank in the collection of checks. Action by banks handling the share
draft for collection would also be covered by agreement among banks, or
even an agreement resulting from Federal Reserve Bank Operating Let-
ters, which have the force of agreements by all involved parties, whether or
not assented to by all parties interested in the item.75 There is, however,
some division in the cases to date as to whether such agreements by Fed-
eral Reserve fiat apply to drafts and other items which are not collected
through the Federal Reserve Banks.76 If sued for failure to return on de-
mand under U.C.C. section 3-419(1) and (2) the credit union or other thrift
should argue that, under custom and practice in the handling of share
drafts, unless same-day action was explicitly stated, the demand was to
return on the next banking day following delivery and that therefore no
"refusal" had occurred when no return was made on the day of present-
ment. The argument should be based on deposition testimony or other
evidence.
Aside from the possible liability for the face amount of items neither
timely paid nor timely returned where the demand to pay or return accom-
panies the delivery of the item and specifies or implies same day action,
are there other problems?
If a credit union is not treated as a bank for U.C.C. purposes it actually
gets one more day than a bank to give notice of dishonor. A bank must
give notice before its midnight deadline, but any other person has until
midnight of the third business day following dishonor.77 If neither the
payor nor the presenter is involved, the time limits run from receipt of
notice of dishonor from some prior party.
What is the effect of unexcused delay or failure in any necessary present-
ment or in giving notice of dishonor? The Code provides that indorsers
are discharged, but drawers are only discharged if supervening insolvency
of the drawee deprives the drawer of funds on deposit maintained with the
drawee to cover the instrument.78 Fortunately, the section does not limit
75. See U.C.C. § 4-103(2).
76. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. 446
(D. Conn. 1980) (terms of operating circular govern transaction); Kane v. American Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co., 21 111. App. 3d 1046, 316 N.E.2d 177 (1974) (operating circulars and
Federal Reserve Regulations do not apply where item not sent through Federal Reserve
collection channels); Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Federal Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 554 P.2d
1 19 (Okla. Ct. App. 1976) (federal reserve operating letter governs).
77. See U.C.C. § 3-508(2).
78. See id § 3-502(l)(b).
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this to bank failures. The wording covers "drawee or payor bank" and so
the limited or, due to current deposit insurance procedures, the nonexistant
deprivation is for practical purposes no discharge of drawers at all.
Yet viewing what we have discussed about the processing and payment
of items, on net balance credit unions and other thrifts would be more
certain of the applicable legal rules if both Articles 3 and 4 of the Code
applied to the processing and payment of share drafts.
One final processing matter. If a credit union or a savings and loan
association is not treated as a bank for U.C.C. purposes, it may not be
protected in authorizing payment of share drafts bearing restrictive indor-
sements which have not been handled in accordance with the restrictive
indorsement. The Code provision on effect of restrictive indorsements
only immunizes intermediary and payor banks, not commercial drawees.79
But of course the credit union or other thrift has the presentment warranty
of the person seeking payment and of the depositary bank."°
III. ALLOCATION OF Loss FROM WRONGFUL INTRUSIONS INTO THE
PAYMENTS SYSTEM
Risks of loss from wrongful intrusions into the payment system are all,
or almost all, risks that can be placed in two major categories: either they
are external to all legitimate actors in the system or else they are internal to
the operation of one of the legitimate actors in the system. The intrusions
are either wrongful, careless, or accidental. The intrusions may occur at
any one of seven stages which an instrument passes through in carrying
out its basic function of causing the transfer of depositary credit from one
party to another. In the paper message system-and share drafts and other
thrift drafts are paper originated-some of the intrusions and loss alloca-
tions will not apply to drafts. But they will apply to checks and other items
that customers of thrift institutions will deposit to the credit of their thrift-
draft accounts. A brief overview of the risks may thus be of some benefit
someday. The stages at which intrusion can occur are these:
1. The Origination Stage
2. Non-Depositary Institution Transmission Stage
3. Payee Processing Stage
4. Deposit Taking Stage
79. See id § 3-206.
80. Of course if a credit union or a thrift disregards a prior restrictive indorsement on
an item deposited with it, liability to the true owner will be imposed. See Underpinning and
Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 46 N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 1319,
414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979).
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5. Interdepositary Institution Transmission Stage
6. Process of Payment Stage
7. Post-Payment Risk Shifting Stage
Depending on the stage at which the intrusion occurs, or if the risk shifting
rule applies, the result of the intrusion, whether wrongful, careless, or acci-
dental, will be one of three--either delay in the accomplishment of the
task, or a diversion of the depositary institution credit and its withdrawal
by a party not intended to acquire the credit, or a shift away from the
payor of certain normal payor risks. Since time is money, delay can be
costly. And, of course, a total or partial diversion is also costly. Let us
discuss each stage separately.
A. The Origination Stage
Intrusions here will far more often be found in items deposited with
credit unions and other thrifts than in drafts drawn on credit unions or
savings and loans. But we can suppose a customer becomes indisposed
and gives someone a power of attorney which is misused, or drafts from
the back of the book are stolen and used by a forger. In either case we may
have a payee's name placed on the draft which is either that of a nonexis-
tant person or of a real person. The forger or the faithless attorney, as the
case may be, does not intend the name used as payee ever to receive the
proceeds. The forger wants it for personal purposes. In either case, do we
have a forged indorsement? The Code says no.8 It provides that in these
circumstances any indorsement by anyone in the name of the named payee
is effective. In the case of the faithless person with the power of attorney,
all subsequent takers are protected. They took with an authorized
drawer's signature and an effective indorsement. Payment to the presenter
81. U.C.C. § 3-405(l)(b) makes the indorsement by any person in the name of the
named payee "effective" where an authorized signer does not intend the named payee to
have any interest in the instrument. This is the pre-Code "fictitious payee" rule. Pre-Code,
the paper was considered bearer paper. The Code requires a regular chain of indorsements.
The rule does not apply if there is no indorsement in the name of the payee at all. Wright v.
Bank of Cal., 276 Cal. App. 2d 485, 81 Cal. Rptr. 11 (1969). The requirement of a chain of
indorsements gives rise to a means of defeating the effective indorsement if it is not precisely
in the name of the named payee. See Percini Corp. v. First Nat. Bank of Hasersham
County, 533 F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1977); Travco Corp. v. Citizens Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of
Port Huron, 42 Mich. App. 291, 201 N.W.2d 675 (1972); Twellman v. Lindell Trust Co., 534
S.W.2d 83 (Mo. App. 1976). It may also introduce a concept of lack of good faith in ac-
cepting deposits with illegal indorsements, Kraftsman Container Corp. v. United Counties
Trust Co., 169 N.J. Super. 488, 404 A.2d 1288 (Law Div. 1979), or from dealing with a
known employee on a continuous basis with respect to the employer's checks payable to
others. Brighton, Inc. v. Colonial First Nat'l Bank, 176 N.J. Super. 101, 422 A.2d 433 (App.
Div. 1980); Board of Higher Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S. 508
(Sup. Ct. 1976).
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was in fact payment to a holder. The Code goes further in recognizing a
fake indorsement as effective in the case of an impostor-someone pre-
tending to be someone else-who secures the issuance of a share draft in
the name of the person impersonated. For example, a man sells furniture
or an automobile, boat, or house owned by him and his wife. He is accom-
panied by a woman posing as the wife. A draft in the correct names of the
husband and wife is issued to them. The indorsement in the wife's name
by any person is "effective." 82 This is so whether the imposture is created
through the mails, face to face, or otherwise.83
There is a third situation. We can suppose, in our power of attorney
case, the attorney in fact comes to the home to sign papers only periodi-
cally and a servant produces bills to be paid, some of which are fake. The
attorney in fact signs drafts for each of the submitted bills and tells the
servant to mail them off. The Code again makes the indorsement in the
name of the named payee by any person effective if the agent or employee
of the drawer supplying the name does not intend the named payee to
have any interest in the instrument.84 The intent in these cases must have
been formed when the name was supplied and not afterwards when checks
were given to be delivered.85 Whether the name supplied is that of a per-
son to whom no debt is owed or is that of a real creditor is immaterial
except as it may bear on the time the intent of the agent or employee to
embezzle the funds was formed. Thus, the Code allocates these risks, ab-
sent bad faith in the person taking the check from the wrongdoer, to the
drawer who is the person placing confidence in the signer and the name
supplier.
The thrift institution paying these share drafts is protected, but the cus-
tomer is not left in all cases with recourse only against the faithless and
usually worthless embezzlers. If they were so stupid as to use the names of
organizations as payees, place a code-made-effective indorsement thereon,
and then indorse as an individual, the drawer, under a growing number of
decisions, will have a cause of action against the institution accepting the
82. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 63
Misc. 2d 960, 313 N.Y.S.2d 823 (Civ. Ct. 1970); Philadelphia Title Ins. Co. v. Fidelity-
Philadelphia Trust Co., 419 Pa. 78, 212 A.2d 222 (1965).
83. One of the better pre-Code discussions of the impostor rule suggests that the differ-
ence between face to face, where the check issuer bore the loss, and the mail, where usually
the second person duped bore the loss, was really a weighing of a comparative degree of
fault to determine who bore the loss. See Abel, The Impostor Payee.- Or, Rhode Island Was
Right, 1940 Wisc. L. REV. 161 & 362.
84. U.C.C. § 3-405(l)(c).
85. Dayton Price & Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 64 A.D.2d 563, 406 N.Y.S.2d 823
(1978).
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draft for deposit.86 The basis is that the institution taking such paper is not
observing the reasonable commercial standards of banking. It is, of
course, advisable to police incoming deposits to the thrift institution for the
same defect; namely, a payee which is a business or nonprofit enterprise
indorsing a check or draft payable to it to an individual instead of deposit-
ing the draft in its own account.
There is a division of authority as to whether the effectiveness of an
U.C.C. section 3-405 type indorsement is subject to a general rule of care
in accepting deposits, but the policy requiring corporate payees to deposit
and banks to observe restrictive indorsements seems to outweigh, in the
courts, the policy underlying section 3-405.87
The Code does cover negligence "substantially contributing" to altera-
tion or forgery, and precludes the negligent contributor from asserting the
forgery as against a holder in due course or a good faith payor observing
reasonable commercial standards.88 A recent case involving drawer pre-
clusion as to a forged indorsement may have application to some drafting
practices. In United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Merchant's Bank &
Trust Co. ,89 a savings bank honored a forged withdrawal order accompa-
nied by the passbook and a direction to issue a check on its commercial
bank account payable to the person in front of them who represented her-
self as the housekeeper of the customer's daughter who was too busy to
appear this time but had made withdrawals several times in the past. The
lower court found against the savings bank drawer on two grounds, only
one of which was affirmed. Affirmed was the ruling that the drawer's neg-
ligence in honoring the withdrawal order substantially contributed to the
forged indorsement on the check drawn on the commercial bank because
the savings bank's personnel had never before seen or heard of the house-
86. See note 81 supra. See also the special case of a check made payable to a bank,
which must be taken at the risk of the bank as to the title and authority of the depositor
unless applied to a debt of the drawer or deposited in one of its accounts. Federal Sav. &
Loan Ins. Corp. v. Kearney Trust Co., 151 F.2d 720 (8th Cir. 1945); Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v.
United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1978); Arrow Builders
Supply Corp. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 21 N.Y.2d 428, 235 N.E.2d 756 (1968). The cases stem
from Sims v. United States Trust Co., 103 N.Y. 472, 9 N.E. 605 (1886), a case taking an
attitude contra to the policy of the Uniform Fiduciaries Act and U.C.C. § 3-304(2), (4)(e),
requiring actual knowledge of a breach of fiduciary duty, not notice.
87. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank of Milwaukee, 371
F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Wisc. 1974) (negligence of bank does not change rule). The "bad faith"
cases, see note 81 supra, agree that simple negligence in taking the item does not change the
rule. But see McConnico v. Third Nat'l Bank in Nashville, 499 S.W.2d 874 (Tenn. 1973).
88. U.C.C. § 3-406. Note the protected classes are specified. This is not the case under
§ 3-405. The difference was deliberate so long as a regular chain of indorsements was pres-
ent.
89. 28 U.C.C. Rep. 108 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1979).
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keeper and made no effort to verify her authority by a telephone call. Nor
did they compare signatures.
The case is interesting because the lower court used the impostor rule we
have just discussed, but used it erroneously. The general rule is that a
misrepresentation of agency does not fall under the impostor rule.9 ° Yet
cases such as this one, holding that negligence in not verifying an agent's
authority substantially contributes to the forgery of the principal's indorse-
ment on an instrument so obtained, are, in fact, undermining the agency
exception. The only difference between the two results is that when
U.C.C. section 3-406 is used the person purchasing from the wrongdoer
must be a holder in due course to prevail. The drawer or other payor must
pay in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards of the
drawer's or other payor's business to be protected, whereas, as we've dis-
cussed, the prior section just says any indorsement in the name of the
payee is effective with no limitation as to the persons who can assert the
effectiveness.
In the Connecticut case there was no indorsement. The alleged house-
keeper opened an account in another bank in the housekeeper's name and
deposited the check in that account without any indorsement. The deposi-
tary bank placed a stamp on it reading "Credited to the Account of the
within named payee lack of indorsement guaranteed." Referring to
U.C.C. section 4-205(1), entitling a bank to supply its customer's missing
indorsement, the court said the stamp had the same effect as if the deposit-
ing customer had written the payee's name. Thus, there was a forged in-
dorsement which the savings bank was precluded from denying, and the
preclusion applied to its subrogated insurance company. This is one of the
cases on one side of the split of authority under the Code as to whether
section 3-406 retains the pre-Code requirement that the negligence must
directly and proximately induce the taking of the item on the forgery, or
whether the section has broadened the scope of the doctrine by using "sub-
stantially contributes." Holding for no change are decisions in Ohio, Ala-
bama, and the Eighth Circuit.9 For broadening the scope are holdings in
90. See U.C.C. § 3-405 (Official Comment 2). "Impostor refers to impersonation and
does not extend to a false representation that the party is the authorized agent of the payee.
A maker or drawer who takes the precaution of making the instrument payable to the princi-
pal is entitled to have his indorsement." See Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Chemical
Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619, 318 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1970), aff'd , 333
N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1972); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1365, 1398 (1962).
91. Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d 192 (8th Cir. 1974);
East Gadsden Bank v. First City Nat'l Bank, 50 Ala. App. 576, 281 So. 2d 431 (1973); Soci-
ety Nat'l Bank of Cleveland v. Capital Nat'l Bank, 30 Ohio App. 2d 1, 281 N.E.2d 563
(1972).
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Oregon, Connecticut, Indiana, Maryland, and New York.92 A Penn-
sylvania Superior Court case, much cited for the broadening view, has
been recently questioned by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court with a com-
plimentary reference to the Eighth Circuit case espousing the narrower
view.
93
B. Non-Depositary Institution Transmission Stage
The drawer must get the check to the payee. Instrusion by mail inter-
cept is usually an external intrusion. The Code scheme is to place the loss
on the person to whom the wrongdoer passes the check, whether by suit
upstream on the transfer warranties of sections 3-417(2) and 4-207(2) or
with the drawee suing on the presentment warranties.94 Some states per-
mit a drawer suit upstream as a warranty suit by-passing the drawee and
any intermediary banks. This is allowed either on a third party beneficiary
theory95 or on a theory that the drawer is really "paying" the check in
ordinary understanding and hence the presentment warranties run directly
to the drawer as an "other payor."9 6
C Payee Processing Stage
There are many cases where intrusion is internal to a payee's operations,
and the rules here will affect the thrift draft program as thrift customers
will issue many checks to business payees. Here we have employees of the
payee abstracting incoming checks or depositing checks with a "cash out"
deposit slip.97 This can occur with "mail-openers," or accounts receivable
92. Fidelity & Cas. Co. of N.Y. v. Constitution Nat'l Bank, 167 Conn. 478, 356 A.2d
117 (1975); Insurance Co. of N. America v. Purdue Nat'l Bank of Lafayette, 401 N.E.2d 708
(Ind. App. 1980); Dominion Constr., Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Md., 271 Md. 154, 315 A.2d
69 (1974); Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 619,
318 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1970), affd, 333 N.Y.S.2d 726 (App. Div. 1972); Transamerica
Ins. Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank of Or., 276 Or. 945, 558 P.2d 328 (1976).
93. Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 211 Pa. Super. 42, 234 A.2d
32 (1967), was questioned in Commonwealth of Pa. v. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Central
Pa., 469 Pa. 188, 364 A.2d 1331 (1976).
94. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 3-417, 4-207(1).
95. Allied Concord Financial Corp. v. Bank of America, 275 Cal. App. 2d 1, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 622 (1969); International Indus., Inc. v. Ostrand State Bank, 348 F. Supp. 886, (S.D.
Tex. 1971); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Marine Nat'l Exch. Bank, 315 F. Supp. 520 (E.D. Wisc.
1970).
96. Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920, 148 Cal. Rptr.
2d 329 (1978). But the theory advanced has been followed by other courts. Insurance Co. of
N. America v. Atlas Supply Co., 121 Ga. App. 1,172 S.E.2d 632 (1970); Insurance Co. of N.
America v. Purdue Nat'l Bank of Lafayette, 401 N.E.2d 708 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980).
97. For examples of cases involing forged endorsements on incoming checks by em-
ployees of the payee see Hermetic Refrigeration Co. v. Central Valley Nat'l Bank, 493 F.2d
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posting personnel, or bookkeepers, or those taking the payee's deposits to
its depositary institution. The Code treats all of these as forged indorse-
ments with the rules of warranty and conversion allocating the risk of loss
ultimately to the first solvent handler after the forger. 98 There is no excep-
tion for internal employee forgery or other intrusion at the payee process-
ing stage unless a court can be persuaded that negligent supervision of the
wrongdoing employee "substantially contributed" to the forgery so that
the rule of U.C.C. section 3-406 can apply. In a now well-known case,
Cooper v. Union Bank,9 the court found that drawer negligence in not
auditing or otherwise checking up on a lawyer's secretary's repetitive for-
gery of the lawyer payee's indorsement on incoming checks barred the
lawyer from asserting forgery on checks coming in after six months of suc-
cessful embezzlement. A Michigan court of first instance, however, in
Greishaber v. Michigan National Bank of Detroit,'o accepted an account-
ant's testimony that the supervision exercised there was the same as that
exercised by eighty to eighty-five percent of other dentists. On this testi-
mony, the court found no negligence in the payee dentist. Hence, the bank
sued bore any loss it could not recoup from its transferor.
476 (9th Cir. 1974); Cooper v. Union Bank, 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal Rptr. I
(1973); Cairo Coop. Exch. v. First Nat'l Bank of Cunningham, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 748 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1980) (bank protected on interpretation of corporate resolution giving the forger au-
thority to act for corporation in "all transactions" with the bank; case is presently being
appealed); Sheriff Goslin Co. v. Cawood, 91 Mich. App. 204, 283 N.W. 2d 6911 (Ct. App.
1979); Mott Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Bismark, 259 N.W.2d 667 (N.D.
1977); West Penn Administration, Inc. v. Union Nat'l Bank, 233 Pa. Super. Ct. 311, 335
A.2d 725 (1975) (lock box operation); Ervin v. Dauphin Deposit & Trust Co., 84 Dauph.
280, 38 Pa. D. & C.2d 473 (Pa. C.P. 1965); Womack Mach. Supply Co. of Houston v. Fannin
Bank, 499 S.W.2d 917, (Tex. Ct. App. 1973), rev'd, 504 S.W.2d 827 (1974).
98. This is liability for breach of the "presentment warranty" of good title, U.C.C. §§ 3-
417(1)(a) and 4-207(1)(a), whereby the drawee recovers from the presenting bank. The
presenting bank and other banks collect reimbursement upstream by virtue of the "transfer
warranty" of good title, §§ 3-417(2)(a) and 4-207(2)(a). The chain is broken if one tranferor
did not "receive consideration," as such a transferor makes no warranty. The "triggering"
language in the subsection stating the transfer warranty is "any person who transfers an
instrument and receives consideration. (emphasis supplied). Multiplicity of action up
the collective chain can be eliminated by the use of the "vouching in" process in U.C.C. § 3-
803. The Code, unfortunately, follows the common law privity concept of Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 281 N.Y. 162, 22 N.E.2d 324 (1939) so
that the vouching notice can go only to a bank's immediate transferor. But this concept is
totally inconsistent with the California courts' rulings allowing direct suit by a drawer
against a remote depositary bank. The term "answerable over" found in U.C.C. § 3-803
should be interpreted as coequal in scope with the direct action allowed the notice giver.
The occasional case of an intermediate set-off should not prevent this result. The loss of the
amount set-off would be the basis of a further upstream warranty claim in any event. Direct
"vouching" to the person of ultimate liability should be permitted.
99. 9 Cal. 3d 371, 507 P.2d 609, 107 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1973).
100. 18 U.C.C. Rep. 1248 (Mich. C.P. 1976).
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D. Deposit Taking Stage
The rules here will apply to thrift institutions accepting checks and other
items for deposit, as well as to claims for refund of payments made on a
customer's drafts.
First, it is expected that checks will be examined for a regular chain of
indorsements, although, as we have seen, under U.C.C. section 4-205(1) a
depositary bank can supply "its customer's indorsement." But where there
are copayees and the indorsement of one is missing or is forged, the loss
falls on the depositary institution, which, of course, has the warranty of its
depositor. So, too, where a corporate check signed by an authorized signer
is taken for that signer's personal debt, whether in payment or as security,
and its use for that purpose is not proper.'' This is because section 3-
304(2) prevents holding in due course as there is notice that a fiduciary is
using corporate funds for the fiduciary's own obligations. The trouble is
worse when a third party's check payable to the bank is deposited, without
inquiry, into an individual's account or applied towards an indebtedness of
anyone except the drawer.'0 2 The rule is that the depositary bank is liable
if the individual's action was proper. Of course, if the item is payable to
the bank "for account of' or with an account number added to the name
of the bank on the payee line, the rule is otherwise.'0 3 The drawer has told
the bank what to do. Also applicable here is the rule that a check payable
to a corporation and indorsed by it to another is, in the words of section 3-
304(l)(a) "so irregular as to call into. question its validity, terms, or owner-
ship," as discussed above under the "effective" indorsement rules of sec-
tion 3-405."°
A thrift institution is also heading for trouble if an indorsement prior to
that of one of its members is a restrictive one of the "for deposit" or "for
collection" type, even if the institution is considered as a bank. A recent
New York Court of Appeals case illustrates this. In Underpriming and
Foundation Constructors, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank,05 there was a
phony "invoice-insertion-scam" using the name of a real customer of the
101. See, e.g., Continental Bank v. Wa-Ho Truck Brokerage, 122 Ariz. 414, 595 P.2d 206
(Ariz. App. 1979); Dayton, Price & Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 22 U.C.C. Rep. 454 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1977); Board of Higher Educ. v. Bankers Trust Co., 86 Misc. 2d 560, 383 N.Y.S.2d
508 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Swiss Baco Skyline Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 18 Wash. App. 21, 567
P.2d 1141 (Ct. App. 1977).
102. See, e.g., Sun 'N Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 582 P.2d 920
(1978); Bank of S. Md. v. Robertson's Crab House, 39 Md. App. 707, 389 A.2d 388 (1979).
103. See Swiss Baco Skyline Logging, Inc. v. Haliewicz, 18 Wash. App. 21, 567 P.2d 1141
(Ct. App. 1977) as to wire transfer to bank followed by account number.
104. See notes 81-87 and accompanying text supra.
105. 46 N.Y.2d 459, 386 N.E.2d 319, 414 N.Y.S.2d 298 (1979). But see Cairo Coop. Exch.
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drawer so that any indorsement in the name of the named payee was "ef-
fective" under U.C.C. section 3-405(l)(c). Unfortunately for the banks,
the crooks copied the indorsement of the named payee too literally and the
rubber stamp said "For deposit only." Below that was the indorsement of
the depositor selected by the crooks to collect and distribute the proceeds.
The New York court permitted a direct suit by the drawer against the de-
positary bank stating, in effect, that its failure to police the prior restrictive
indorsement was the cause of the successful depletion of the drawer's ac-
count at the payor bank, and that, since the named payee had no interest,
someone had to be able to sue.
Finally, payable-through drafts issued by insurance companies can
cause trouble if disbursed against before being paid by the drawee. In
Montgomery v. First National Bank,"°6 such a practice was ruled a failure
to deal with the draft in accordance with reasonable commercial standards
of the banking business. The court was aided by the bank's own tellers'
manual stating that such drafts should not be cashed over the counter.
Courts should see the difference between insurance company payable-
through drafts and those of credit unions or other thrifts-where a differ-
ent function is served by making the draft payable through-as there is no
checking by the drawee to see if releases are received, or are in order, or
the like, before authorizing payment. The function is to obtain the data
processing services of the designated bank by using its transit routing num-
bers. The Montgomery rule should not apply to share drafts.
E Interdepositary Institution Transmission Stage
At this fifth stage, the losses to be allocated arise from physical destruc-
tion of the paper message, from misencoding by the first encoding institu-
tion, and from loss or delay in transit. In general, the scheme of the
U.C.C. is to allocate any loss or delay damages to the creditor, taking in
conditional payment the nonbank-issued instrument involved-unless of
course a specific agreement between debtor and creditor reallocates the
risk. The Code provides that the taking of an instrument suspends the
underlying obligation and any discharge of an obligor on the instrument is
a discharge on the underlying obligation. 7 If there is no discharge, and if
v. First Nat'l Bank of Cunningham, 28 U.C.C. Rep. 752 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting rule
of Underpinning).
106. 265 Or. 55, 508 P.2d 428 (1973) (employees ignored provision in bank's tellers' man-
ual).
107. U.C.C. § 3-802(I)(b). As to bank obligations, U.C.C. § 3-802(l)(a) gives a dis-
charge. There is no reason why this latter rule of discharge should not apply, as well to
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the instrument is dishonored, the creditor may sue either on the instrument
or on the underlying obligation.
Case law says that if the instrument is paid, the payment relates back to
the day the creditor voluntarily accepted the instrument. 0 8 Delay costs, in
the case of ultimate payment, thus fall on the creditor. In the case of ulti-
mate dishonor, they fall on the debtor.
But there is no U.C.C. rule fixing a time limit on transmission between
banks. The limits are only on processing time within banks. The only sec-
tion on transmission time merely requires the bank to use ordinary care to
send the item on to the next bank by a reasonably prompt method consid-
ering relevant instructions, the nature of the item, the number thereof on
hand, the costs involved in different types of sending, and the method gen-
erally used by the bank "or others" to present such items."9 The sending
bank must notify its transferor only when it has actual knowledge of the
delay. In any event, the measure of damages prescribed for a bank's fail-
ure to use ordinary care, if that can be proved, is "the amount of the item
reduced by" an amount that could not have been realized had ordinary
care been used."' "Bad faith" must be shown to recover damages based
on a loss of use of funds.
Perhaps it was felt that the force majeure clause in Article 4I1 would
excuse most if not all interinstitutional delays. But delays in meeting in-
trabank midnight deadlines caused by an armored car breakdown" 2 and a
computer breakdown after the Christmas holiday" 13 have been held to be
no excuse, while a delay caused by the malfunction of a new computer,
plus assurances which proved to be false that the "down time" would be
only a short while, has been held to be an excuse.
14
That normal collections can have considerable delays within the United
States is illustrated by Wells Fargo Bank v. Hartford National Bank & Trust
checks issued by thrifts on their commercial banks and to their own items drawn on them-
selves (assuming corporate power to issue).
108. Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969) (On a
check deposited with deposit slip deducting "cash out" from amount of check and the re-
mainder entered as total deposit, court said check was paid in full, no right of charge back. A
deposit agreement could well change the result.)
109. U.C.C. § 4-204(1).
110. Id §4-103(5).
Ill. Id §4-108(2).
112. Sun River Cattle Co. v. Miners Bank, 164 Mont. 237, 521 P.2d 679 (1974).
113. Blake v. Woodford Bank & Trust Co., 21 U.C.C. Rep. 383 (Ky. 1977).
114. Port City State Bank v. American Nat'l Bank, 486 F.2d 196 (10th Cir. 1973). But
excuse must be current with the processing time. Accountability was not defeated by a 38-
day unrenewed stop order. Templeton v. First Nat'l Bank of Nashville, 47 Ill. App. 3d. 443,
362 N.E.2d 33 (1977).
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Co. , 5 where a check deposited in Connecticut on November 22, 1977,
was not presented to the Reno, Nevada Branch of the payor bank until
December 10. The return did not reach Connecticut until December 27,
yet each bank involved acted within what it thought was its midnight
deadline. The holding was, of course, that one collecting bank was wrong
in the calculation of its midnight deadline by four days and so bore the
$25,000 loss.
Misencoding and error in the transmission of the MICR line, if these
errors happen, and they will, are not covered by the U.C.C. in any specific
way. What little litigation that has occurred seems to allocate the loss to
the one making the misencoding and to hold that the amount written by
the drawer controls.' 16 Thus, where an underencoded item had been
charged to the account, the drawer nevertheless had lost the ability to place
a stop order against the corrective charge." 7 Clearing house rules, if they
exist, will, of course, govern if they speak to the misencoding issue-as
many in fact do.
F Process of Payment Stage
We have already discussed the problems arising in determining when
payment is made and the priority of the four legals under the problems of
the drawer-drawee relationship. If the thrift institution is a bank for
U.C.C. purposes when items are returned to it, it can assert a right of
charge back despite any claim by its customer that it or another bank
failed to use ordinary care. 8 The section is clearly one which, in reason
and policy, should be applied even if thrift institutions are not banks for all
U.C.C. purposes. They should be treated as banks in all instances where
115. 484 F. Supp. 817 (D. Conn. 1980). Cf. Available Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat'l
Bank of Blue Island, 56 Ill. App. 3d 516, 371 N.E.2d 1032 (1977) (even though "accepted for
collection," the word "send" requires written notice of dishonor).
116. Exchange Bank of St. Augustine v. Florida Nat'l Bank of Jacksonville, 292 So. 2d
361 (Fla. 1974) (intermediary bank misencoded routing symbol); State ex rel Gabalac v.
Firestone Bank, 46 Ohio App. 2d 124, 346 N.E.2d 326 (1975) (must recredit account). Seem-
ingly, recovery under a restitutionary theory could be had notwithstanding U.C.C. § 3-418.
Bank of Wiliston v. Alderman, 106 S.C. 386, 91 S.E. 296 (1917) (recovery for teller's cashing
error). An intermediary bank might assert the "innocent agent" paid over the proceeds rule
of U.C.C. § 3-419(3), but this should not be available to the bank actually making the en-
coding error. Where the check is underencoded, the payor bank has the right to debit the
corrective amount despite a drawer's directions to the contrary. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co. of Augusta v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 238 Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977).
117. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Augusta v. Georgia R.R. Bank & Trust Co., 238
Ga. 693, 235 S.E.2d 1 (1977).
118. U.C.C. § 4-212.
[Vol. 30:159
NO Ws, NINO Ws, Share Drafts
the collection of drafts necessarily must smoothly interface with the collec-
tion system of banks for the proper serving of the public convenience.
Care must be taken in the drafting of the agreement with the payable-
through bank that the entire payment function is not delegated to it, but
only the processing function. Regulation J of the Federal Reserve System
includes a payable-through bank in its definition of paying bank." 9 This
definition need not be fully equated with the Code's "payor bank" for all
purposes, but it must be so equated for the time allowed to complete the
entire process of payment as the functions of making payment are allo-
cated between the thrift institution and its designated payable-through
bank.
G. Post-Payment Risk-Shifting Stage
May a suit by a thrift institution for breach of a presentment warranty
be lost if there is delay in bringing the suit? If the institution is treated as a
bank, as it should be, then Article 4 Code rules would apply. The war-
ranty section in the Article provides that a claim for breach of warranty
must be made within a reasonable time after the person claiming learns of
the breach. 2o Failure to do so discharges the person liable "to the extent
of any loss caused by the delay." Probably a court would, and it should,
apply the same rule to a case where only the Article 3 rules apply even
though Article 3 has no express counterpart of the Article 4 language.
Comment 1 to the Article 3 warranty section states:
Warranty terms, which are not limited to sales transactions, are
used with the intention of bringing in all the usual rules pertain-
ing to warranties, and in particular the necessity of reliance in
good faith, and the availability of all the remedies for breach of
warranty, such as rescission of the transaction or an action for
damages. 121
The necessity for prompt notice is one of "all the usual rules" and the
discharge to the extent of the loss caused by the delay seems better than the
"forever barred from any remedy" imposed by Article 2122 for failure to
give notice of a breach of a sales warranty.
23
As between drawer and payor bank, both the common law and the
119. See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
120. U.C.C. § 4-207(4).
121. Id § 3-417 (Official Comment 1).
122. Id § 2-607(3)(a).
123. The argument that the expression of a rule of prompt notice in the Article 4 warran-
ties means no notice requirement where only Article 3 applies fails because the language in
Article 4 cuts down the usual warranty rule, rather than stating a rule where none existed.
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U.C.C. change certain loss allocations if the drawer fails to use reasonable
care to examine the periodic statement and report unauthorized drawer's
signatures and alterations. 24 The thrust of the rule is that in the case of
the first statement all unauthorized drawer's signatures or alterations are
the responsibility of the good faith drawee, unless it can show that a
prompt report would have enabled it to effect some recovery. That is, the
failure to report or delay in reporting caused a loss and the bank had paid
in good faith. 125 The late reporting drawer can nevertheless avoid picking
up the loss if it can be shown that the bank failed to exercise ordinary care
in paying the item.
126
A further rule applies to repetitive unauthorized signatures or altera-
tions committed by the same person. The examination of the statement
and report must be completed in a reasonable time not to exceed fourteen
days, and the customer reporting late is precluded as to subsequent forger-
ies paid after the fourteen-day period and before actual notification, so
long as payment continued to be made in good faith. 127 Again, of course,
if the customer can show lack of ordinary care in making the payment, the
preclusion does not apply.
Finally, without regard to care or lack of it by drawer or payor, there is a
three-year notice bar for unauthorized indorsements. 28 These are the
time limits in the official text. Many states have made changes, so the ap-
plicable state law must be consulted.'
29
Repetitive forgeries of the signature of a thrift institution's customer on
drafts will be extremely rare except in one situation: where one spouse
takes the drafts and signs them for the other spouse either on the separate
account of the other spouse or on a two signature joint account where both
signatures are required. Then comes the marital dissolution and the suit to
recredit the account. A clear defense to repetitive forgeries would be help-
ful to thrifts. It is there if courts will apply Article 4 to the thrifts.
There is one more trouble other than "are you a bank" in the applica-
tion of section 4-406 of the Code to credit unions. The time periods start to
run "when a bank sends to its customer a statement of account accompa-
nied by items paid in good faith." This will not happen under an intercept
124. U.C.C. § 4-406.
125. Id § 4-406(l), (2)(a).
126. Id § 4-406(3).
127. Id § 4-406(2)(b).
128. Id § 4-406(4).
129. For example, the periods in Georgia are 60 days and I year respectively. GA. CODE
ANN. § 109A-4--406(4) (1979). California and others use one year in both instances. See
CAL. COM. CODE § 4406(4) (West 1964).
[Vol. 30:159
NO Ws, NINO Ws, Share Drafts
truncation at the payable-through bank, nor will the credit union, as the
section also provides, be holding the statement and items for the member
pursuant to request or instructions.
But section 4-406 mentions a third way that will start a customer's time
period for examination: namely, that the institution "or otherwise in a
reasonable manner makes the statement and the items available" to the
member. Does that apply to the situation? The institution will be sending
a statement and its specifications state that a print of the copy made by the
payable-through bank will be supplied to the customer on request.
But what are the specifications for the film and camera to be used to
make the copies? Will they be accurate enough to permit an examiner of
questioned documents to give an opinion on any but the most clumsy for-
geries, as to which the Code makes the payor liable anyway for not using
ordinary care in examining signatures? Put another way: if the customer
claims a forgery, is the film good enough to permit a handwriting expert to
say, as a witness for the paying institution, that it is not a forgery or that it
is such a good forgery that careful signature examiners would not have
caught it? Discussion with one expert elicited his opinion that an expert
opinion cannot be given from the film copies now being made.'3 °
There is another problem with the program and that's because the paya-
ble-through bank is programing a destruction of the original drafts within
sixty days after the end of the month in which the drafts were paid.
Parenthetically, assuming that there is a retrieval capability for the origi-
nal if request is made before the routine destruction, if a draft is paid on
March 29th it will be destroyed on May 30th. But suppose the statement
cycle for the customer ends on the 20th of the month, so that the first list-
ing the member receives covering the payment will be sent, say April 27th
arriving April 28th. The proposed contracts to be used by credit unions
give the member sixty days to object,' 3 ' or until June 27th or twenty-eight
days after destruction of the draft. But if the Code sections just discussed
were applicable, the customer should have reported by May 12th when the
questioned draft had not yet been destroyed and could have been retrieved
for examination and preservation as evidence.
130. Conversation with David Purtell, Examiner of Questioned Documents in Chicago,
October 24, 1980.
13 1. The contract provision requires objections to be made in 60 days from receipt of the
statement. A 30-day time limit has been upheld as not unreasonable. New York Credit
Men's Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 41 A.D.2d 912, 343
N.Y.S.2d 538 (1973); Webster Schott Bldg., Inc. v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 32
A.D.2d 744, 300 N.Y.S.2d 1022 (1969), app. denied, 26 N.Y.2d 611, 309 N.Y.S.,2d 1028, 258
N.E.2d 104 (1970).
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Now suppose the particular thrift institution operated on a quarterly
statement system cycling at, say, the 15th and 30th of each month. The
particular customer is on a 15th of the month quarterly cycle. March 15
was the end of the preceding cycle. All other facts are the same except the
statement is not even sent out until June 15th or two weeks after the origi-
nal draft is routinely destroyed. In this scenario, the Code section would
not have been of any help to either party.'32
Suppose the claim is for a raised draft. If the original is available, an
examiner of questioned documents can, by subjecting the original to differ-
ent light rays, tell if the figures have been altered by the same or a different
ink. This, it is believed, cannot be done from a photographic copy.
The point to be made here is that a better coordination between the
routine destruction of the original drafts, the timing for reporting unautho-
rized signatures or alterations, and the credit union or thrift institution
statement cycles, should be worked out. And in view of the fourteen-day
rule in U.C.C. section 4-406, it could be done by specifying a shorter time
for reporting forgery or alteration than the draft account contracts now
specify.
133
One can suggest that a court could be persuaded to rule that the state-
ment with a legend that copies will be available on request would start the
U.C.C. section 4-406 period running and that a request for a copy to deter-
mine whether there was an unauthorized signature or alteration in amount
would be a sufficient "report." One can also suggest that an institution
could by contract with its customer specifically provide that a failure to
make such a request would bar future claims as to alteration in amount or
authorization of the draft. A change in the payee's name, a rare form of
alteration, would have to be excepted and the loss absorbed by the institu-
tions as a cost of the processing savings.
IV. CONCLUSION
Our little trip with gun and camera through the wilderness of Articles 3
and 4 has really revealed, if it has indeed revealed anything at all, only the
132. Perhaps it was for similar timing reasons that the National Commission on Electric
Fund Transfers recommended, Congress enacted, and Regulation E of the Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System provides that a statement must be sent covering each
month in which an electronic transaction in an account takes place. See, e.g., Fed. Res. Reg.
E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.9 (1980)
133. It is another problem to reconcile the U.C.C.'s provisions with the dispute mecha-
nisms applicable to credit cards, debit cards and other electonic funds transfer provisions.
Compare Consumer Credit Protection Act § 161, 15 U.S.C. § 1666 (1976) with Electronic
Fund Transfer Act, § 908, 15 U.S.C. § 1693f (Supp. III, 1979) (effective May 10, 1980); Fed.
Res. Reg. E § 205.11, 12 C.F.R. § 205.11 (1980).
[Vol. 30:159
NO Ws, NINO Ws, Share Drafts
tips of several icebergs. The author can only hope he has alerted readers to
the need to prepare to steer between the icebergs. For every rule discussed
there are exceptions based on ratification, estoppel, election of remedies,
and the like, and the rules as to these must be examined before advising a
client.
On net balance, the author believes, in each case, thrift institutions will
be better off to urge the court to apply the Code either directly by inter-
preting the "business of banking" for Code purposes to be the handling of
third party payment instruments by any properly organized and author-
ized depositary institution; or, if unsuccessful in that regard, to argue for
the application of the Code by analogy as expressing the proper allocation
of risks. The situation can be aided by including in the thrift draft account
contracts two extra clauses. One would provide that the relations between
the institution and its customer shall be governed by the rules of the Uni-
form Commercial Code applicable to a bank and its customer. The other,
for all joint accounts, should be a grant by each signer on the account of a
power of attorney to each other signer on the account to indorse for de-
posit to the account any check, draft, or other item payable to any two or
more of the parties to the joint account. In this way the loss allocation
rules will be identical with the rules applicable to checks. The simplicity of
a single rule will prevent much confusion as NOWs and share drafts pro-
liferate. Of course, much trouble will be eliminated if rapid adoption by
legislatures of the suggested change in the definition of banking in the
U.C.C. can be accomplished.
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